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A remarkable resurgence of interest in the philosophy of Henri Bergson has
developed—in France certainly, but also in the Anglophone world—over
the last few decades. A principal reason why the influence of his philosophy
had previously declined, however, concerns his position regarding the Great
War of 1914–18.1 Bergson played a leading role in diplomatic missions that
helped to bring the US into the war on the Allied side,2 but he also charac-
terized the conflict in a series of discourses that posterity often judged
severely, and that still have the power to shock. In the first, presented
shortly after the outbreak of hostilities—and Germany’s invasion of Belgium
1 On this point, see Vincent Peillon’s preface to Annales bergsoniennes: Tome 5, Bergson
et la politique, ed. Fre´de´ric Worms (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2012) and the
introduction to Philippe Soulez, Bergson politique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1989). The point remains largely unrecognized in English-language studies of Bergson,
and Alexandre Lefebvre and Melanie White’s Bergson, Politics, and Religion (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2012), “the first volume in English dedicated to the political and
religious aspects of his thought” (1), contains no essay directly on Bergson’s discourses in
1914–18. For an account of the decline of Bergson’s influence after 1918, see the final
chapter of Franc¸ois Azouvi, La gloire de Bergson (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), and for gen-
eral studies of the fate of Bergsonism in the twentieth century, see Giuseppe Bianco, Apre`s
Bergson: Portrait de group avec philosophe (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2015)
and Heike Delitz, Bergson Effekte: Aversionen und Attraktionen im franzo¨sischen sozio-
logischen Denken (Weilerswist: Velbru¨ck, 2015).
2 See Philippe Soulez, “Les missions de Bergson: Les paradoxes du philosophe ve´ridique
et trompeur” in Soulez, ed., Les philosophes et la guerre de 14 (Saint Denis: Presses
Universitaires de Vincennes, 1988), 65–81.
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—on August 8, 1914, to the Acade´mie des sciences morales et politiques,
Bergson proclaimed:
[t]he struggle begun against Germany is a struggle of civilisation
against barbarism. Everyone feels this, but our Academy has per-
haps a particular authority in order to say it. Dedicated, mainly,
to the study of psychological, moral and social questions, it carries
out its simple scientific duty in pointing out Germany’s brutality
and cynicism, and in its disdain for all justice and all truth, a
regression to a state of savagery.3
In the name of science, and as president of the Acade´mie, Bergson charac-
terizes the conflict not as a clash of civilizations, but as a struggle between
a bastion of civilization and savage barbarism. This “scientific” observation
became a recurrent motif in French war propaganda, and it caused conster-
nation among German intellectuals; with such a reductive view of the con-
flict, it was held, France’s greatest philosopher had succumbed to
“chauvinism.”4 That Bergson, a few months later, also claimed that if he
had to choose between indignation and understanding in relation to Ger-
many, he would prefer indignation, and that German philosophy was
merely “the intellectual transposition of its brutality, its appetites and its
vices,”5 seems to provide further justification for this accusation, variations
of which were made in France after the war, most notably by Julien Benda,
Georges Politzer, and Paul Nizan.6
3 Bergson, “Discours prononce´ a` l’Acade´mie des sciences morales et politiques, 8 Aout
1914,” in Me´langes, ed. Andre´ Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972),
1102: “La lutte engage´e contre l’Allemagne est la lutte meˆme de la civilisation contre la
barbarie. Tout le monde le sent, mais notre Acade´mie a peut-eˆtre une autorite´ particulie`re
pour le dire. Voue´e en grand partie a` l’e´tude des questions psychologiques, morales et
sociales, elle accomplit un simple devoir scientifique en signalant dans la brutalite´ et le
cynisme de l’Allemagne, dans son me´pris de toute justice et de toute ve´rite´, une re´gression
a` l’e´tat sauvage.” Henceforth I refer to Me´langes with the abbreviation M.
4 Wilhelm Wundt, “Besprechung von Bo¨nke, Plagiator Bergson,” Literarisches Zentral-
blatt fu¨r Deutschland 66 (1915): 1131–38, at 1137.
5 Both quotations: “Discours en se´ance publique annuelle de l’Acade´mie des sciences
morales et politiques—samedi 12 de´cembre 1914,” M 1107–29. This discourse has been
translated as “Life and Matter in Conflict” in Bergson, The Meaning of the War, trans.
H. Wildon-Carr (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1915), 15–40. I refer to it after a forward
slash in the references to Me´langes with the abbreviation MW. For the two quotations,
see M 1108/MW 17 and M 1113/MW 30 respectively.
6 See Julien Benda, La trahison des clercs (Paris: Grasset, 1979 [1927]); Georges Politzer,
La fin d’une parade philosophique: Le bergsonisme, in Politzer, Contre Bergson et quel-
ques autres: Ecrits philosophiques 1924–1939, ed. Roger Bruyeron (Paris: Flammarion,
2013), 127–244 (originally published under the pseudonym F. Arouet in 1929); and Paul
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Most French and German intellectuals adopted nationalist positions in
1914,7 but what is interesting about Bergson’s case is that he mobilizes the
basic framework of his own philosophy to characterize France’s struggle
against Germany. In his 1907 Creative Evolution, and by analogy with an
account of human creativity in art,8 Bergson posits as the principle of all
biological and psychological life an e´lan vital, understood as a power of
creation that constantly has to overcome the mechanical inertia of matter
in its production of new forms of life. Seven years later, in a discourse to
the Acade´mie in December 1914, this philosophy of art as a philosophy of
life in general is transposed into the domain of international relations.
France is characterized not simply as defending civilization, justice, and
international law, but also as a dynamic and self-renewing power of cre-
ation, in opposition to the German Reich, which, as the force of a spiritless
and static mechanism, is bound, for all its might, to wear itself out: “[o]n
the one hand, mechanism, the manufactured thing unable to repair itself;
on the other, life, power of creation, which makes itself and remakes itself
at each instant.”9
As Philippe Soulez has noted, despite their “polemical” and “partisan
nature,” “Bergson’s wartime discourses share enough similarities with his
previous philosophy for us to recognise ‘Bergson’ in them.”10 They clearly
offer an account of the conflict between France and Germany that draws
on Bergson’s own philosophy of life as creation. Yet this gives rise to a
question: what exactly is this doctrine of life as creation such that it can
characterize now the production of artworks, now the process of psycho-
logical and biological life, now the French nation at war with Germany?
Nizan, Les chiens de garde (Paris: Rieder, 1932). I return to Politzer and Benda, but on
all three thinkers as together marking a break with Bergsonism in the development of
twentieth-century French philosophy, see Fre´de´ric Worms, La philosophie en France au
XIXe`me sie`cle: Moments (Paris: Gallimard, 2009), 194–99.
7 The literature on French and German intellectuals during the war is capacious, but see,
for example, Roger Bruyeron, 1914: L’entre´e en guerre de quelque philosophes (Paris:
Hermann, 2014); Fre´de´ric Worms and Caterina Zanfi, eds., Revue de me´taphysique et de
morale, no. 84 (2014/4), L’Europe philosophique des congre`s a` la guerre, particularly in
that the editors’ introduction (459–66) contains important remarks on Bergson; Martha
Hanna, The Mobilization of Intellect: French Scholars and Writers during the Great War
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); and Anne Rasmussen and Chris-
tophe Prochasson, Au nom de la patrie: Les intellectuels francais et la Premie`re Guerre
mondiale, 1910–1919 (Paris: La de´couverte, 1996).
8 I return to this point, but see also Caterina Zanfi, Bergson et la philosophie allemande
(Paris: Armand Colin, 2014), 97.
9 M 1116/MW 38.
10 Soulez, Bergson politique, 266; Soulez, “Bergson as Philosopher of War and Theorist
of the Political,” in Lefebvre and White, Bergson, Politics and Religion, 99–125, at 99.
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Only in responding to this question, I argue, is it possible to address ade-
quately what Nadia Kisukidi has recently described as “two persistent dif-
ficulties” relating to Bergson’s wartime discourses: “How is it that the
philosophical concepts of Creative Evolution are merged into this war rhet-
oric?,” and “Why do passages of the wartime discourses anticipate certain
reflections” in Bergson’s 1932 The Two Sources of Morality and Religion?11
I argue that Bergson is able to mobilize his philosophy of creation in 1914
because that philosophy is at bottom—as commentators are coming, once
again, to recognize12—a philosophy of the will. In the idea of the e´lan vital
as a dynamic, creative force there lies a conception of the will as a self-
grounding, self-asserting, and self-augmenting voluntary force—and this
becomes all the more evident in the way that Bergson mobilizes his philoso-
phy. In order to justify and develop this thesis, however, it is necessary
to examine Bergson’s characterization of Germany at war, the voluntarist
conceptions of life and creation that he mobilizes for the French war effort,
and, finally, how this voluntarism informs his return to the central themes
of the wartime discourses in The Two Sources.
I. GERMANY AND THE THREAT
OF MODERN MACHINISM
Bergson’s December 1914 Acade´mie discourse contains his most concerted
interpretation of the war, and within it he traces Germany’s responsibility
back to a fundamental “choice” it faced in its unification. Through an inter-
nal development, by a “natural effort of life,” the sort of “unity in diversity,
which is the distinguishing mark of organized beings” could have arisen
among the politically backward but culturally rich German states. Instead,
a power at once “interior” and “external (a` coˆte´)” to Germany forced it
into becoming what it was not. This power was Prussia, where “everything
11 Nadia Yala Kisukidi, “Bergson et la guerre de 1914–1918: Pre´sentation du dossier,” in
Annales bergsoniennes VII: Bergson, l’Allemagne, la guerre de 1914, ed. Arnaud
Franc¸ois, Nadia Yala Kisukidi, Camille Riquier, Caterina Zanfi, and Fre´de´ric Worms
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2014), 101–13, at 105.
12 For recent studies of Bergson and the will, see Arnaud Franc¸ois, Nietzsche, Schopen-
hauer, Bergson: Volonte´ et re´alite (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009); Anne
Devarieux, “Maine de Biran—Bergson: L’avenir de la volonte´,” in Bergson, ed. Camille
Riquier (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 2012), 163–91; and Wahida Khandker’s “The Idea of
Will and Organic Evolution in Bergson’s Philosophy of Life,” Continental Philosophy
Review 46, no. 1 (2013): 57–74.
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tended to happen mechanically,” which was itself constituted “mechani-
cally by the simple addition of acquired and conquered territories,”13 and
which by brute, mechanical force imposed unity on Germany in a way that
transformed its spirit:
The time when her philosophers proclaimed the inviolability of
right, the eminent dignity of the person, the duty of mutual respect
among nations, is no more. Germany, militarized by Prussia, has
cast aside those noble ideas. . . . She has made for herself a new
soul, or rather she has meekly accepted the soul Bismarck gave
her.14
The German states failed to resist a rapine, mechanistic Prussian spirit of
conquest, and their soul has been wholly transformed as a result: respect
for law and the dignity of the person has been replaced with the idolization
of force and the crude doctrine that might is right.
Bergson considers the singularity of the new German nation-state since
1870 to result not simply from Prussian imperialism but rather from the
conjunction of the latter with rapid scientific, technological, and industrial
development.15 Not only did the “idea peculiar to that century of diverting
science to the satisfaction of men’s material wants” evoke “a development
of industry, and consequently of commerce, so extraordinary that the old
conception of wealth was completely overthrown,”16 but it gave birth to a
new social form dominated by—as it would be named later in the
century—a military–industrial complex. Although “industry was free to
develop in all directions,” “from the first, war was the end in view”;17 from
the beginning, Bergson argues, technology and industry were in the service
of Germany’s pursuit of power and territorial expansion. Moreover, both
modern industry in its gigantism and the commerce attendant upon it func-
tion in a military fashion: Germany “gave itself an industry and commerce
no less formidable than its army, and that also function militarily.”18
In the development of this military–industrial complex, Bergson senses
13 All quotations in this paragraph M 1109/MW 18–19.
14 This is, in fact, a passage from Bergson’s November 1914 text “La force qui s’use et
celle qui n’use pas”: M 1106/MW 45.
15 On this point, see Florence Caymaex, “Les discours de guerre: Propaganda et philoso-
phie” in Annales bergsoniennes VII, 143–66, at 156.
16 M 1110/MW 23.
17 M 1111/MW 24.
18 M 1110/MW 22.
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an unleashing of powers that transcend even the malign intentions of Prus-
sian leaders. A mechanically minded, imperialist Germany may well have
both desired and been suited to modern technological development, but it
produces “automatically, a very different effect to what its constructors
intended.” Bergson invokes in this connection a version of Goethe’s sorcer-
er’s apprentice: the story of “the witch, who by a magic spell made her
broom handle fetch water with a bucket from the river, but who, having no
formula for stopping it, watched her lair fill up with water before she even-
tually drowned in it.”19 Analogously, Germany has set in motion a process
that gets out of hand, one that, “sooner or later, was to escape all control
and become a race to the abyss.”20 Full of frenzied ambition, Germany
becomes bent on “world-domination” and stops at nothing short of total
war in the pursuit of its imperialist expansion: “from the time when Prus-
sian militarism, now turned into German militarism, had become one with
industrialism, it was the enemy’s industry, his commerce, the sources of his
wealth, his wealth itself, as well as his military power, which war must now
make the end in view,” and to this end “it will massacre women, children
and the elderly; it will pillage and burn; the ideal will be to destroy towns,
villages, the whole population.”21
This analysis of twentieth-century total war and of the imperialist
nation-state as a war machine is important and perhaps prescient, but the
ascription of these phenomena solely to Germany is, in short, propagan-
distic. Though clearly shocked by the real atrocities committed by German
forces in Belgium, Bergson could have offered, as Roger Bruyeron has
recently remarked, a similar sociological analysis with respect to France
and Great Britain, nations that “invent globalisation, extend around the
entire globe their industrial and commercial power, and colonise at will
African and Asian countries.”22 In 1923, in fact, within a brief review of
Alfred de Tarde’s 1915 discourse “Le Maroc, e´cole d’e´nergie,” which
attempts to ascertain the nature of France’s spiritual mission in Morocco,23
19 Both quotations: M 1110/MW 22–23.
20 M 1111/MW 25.
21 M 1113/MW 31.
22 Roger Bruyeron, 1914: L’entre´e en guerre de quelques philosophes, 116. In this connec-
tion, see also Georges Friedman, “La prudence de M. Bergson, ou Philosophie et caract-
e`re,” Commune 30, no. 3 (1936): 721–36.
23 See Alfred de Tarde, “Le Maroc, e´cole d’e´nergie” (Rabat: Imprimerie du “Bulletin
Officiel du Protectorat,” 1915, available at http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6265
2277) and particularly p. 7 for the questions that the discourse addresses: “Qu’est-ce que
la France est venue apporter au Maroc de neuf et de fe´cond? Qu’est-ce que l’aˆme indige`ne,
qu’est-ce que l’aˆme franc¸aise elle-meˆme gagnent a` ce contact?”
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Bergson recognizes “a secret force that since the war of 1870 has led us to
colonize: a revolt of the frustrated energies of our race, a need to act and
teach action.”24 It is not only Germany, then, that has been possessed by an
imperialist drive since 1870.
Bergson is all the more capable of recognizing that the modern techno-
logical condition he describes is no mere national peculiarity in that he
senses, as we have just seen, a momentum proper to modern technology
per se: “on the morrow of the war of 1870,” the German nation “had no
alternative but to become industrial and commercial,”25 and the military–
industrial complex was bound to escape the control of its Prussian archi-
tects. Certainly, Bergson otherwise opposes any form of determinism in
history, technological determinism included, and within an April 1915 talk
on “War and the Literature of Tomorrow,” he advances the voluntarist
position that history is shaped not by “ineluctable laws,” but rather by
“unforeseeable flicks carried out by free wills, creative of their own destiny
and of that of their own country, when they see fit, and in the direction
chosen by them.”26 Ultimately, his position seems to be that Germany’s
responsibility for the war lies in its inability to master—due to its original
choice—the self-propelling forces underlying modern technology. This is
what makes its barbarism, rather than a simple return to a primitive state
as he had previously suggested, a “scientific” or “systematic barbarism.”27
A “philosopher of the future,” when the guns have fallen silent and there is
opportunity for reflection, might speak of the meaning of the war thus:
the idea, proper to the nineteenth century, of employing science
for the satisfaction of material needs had . . . procured for man
more tools than he had produced during the thousands of years in
which he had previously existed on earth. Each new machine being
for man a new organ—an artificial organ that comes to extend his
natural organs—, his body found itself suddenly and prodigiously
enlarged, without his spirit being able to dilate itself quickly
enough to extend itself to the whole of this new body. From this
24 “Rapport sur ‘Le Maroc, e´cole d’e´nergie’ d’Alfred de Tarde,” in M 1395–96, at 1396.
25 M 1110/MW 23.
26 “La guerre et la litte´rature de demain,” M 1151–56, at 1152. On this point, see also
Jean-Benoıˆt Ghenne and Louis Groarke, “The Political Commitment of the Philosopher:
Henri Bergson’s Wartime Discourses: Paradox or Ambiguity?,” in Ideas Under Fire: His-
torical Studies of Philosophy and Science in Adversity, ed. Jonathan Lavery, Louis
Groarke, and William Sweet (New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2012),
193–316, at 200.
27 See Soulez, Bergson politique, 140.
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disproportion are born moral, social and international problems
which most of the nations endeavoured to solve by filling up the
soulless void in the body politic by creating more liberty, more
fraternity, more justice.28
Instead of moderating modern technology by pursuing more freedom and
justice—as has France, Bergson implies, in its pursuit of liberte´, e´galite´,
fraternite´—Germany threatens to enslave humanity to the powers it has
helped to unleash; “instead of a spiritualisation of matter” it threatens “the
mechanisation of spirit.”29
Germany, then, must be opposed as a rapacious, imperialist nation-
state, certainly, but given that its technological capacities have escaped its
control, it is also a victim of dangerous historical forces that threaten, it
would seem, all developing nations. Wildon-Carr was right to remark in
1915 that there is “much more” in Bergson’s discourse “than the utterance
of a philosopher stirred by deep patriotic feeling to uphold his country’s
cause and denounce his country’s foes,” much more than an “indictment of
modern Germany’s rulers or people.”30 It is such an indictment, but it is
more than this insofar as it concerns the future of humanity in the face of
technological development.
II. FRANCE, WILL, AND THE WAR EFFORT
Against a Germany instantiating the unfettered mechanistic forces of
modernity stands France, which embodies a force of another order:
[o]n the one side, there is force spread out on the surface, on the
other, force in depth. On the one hand, mechanism, the manufac-
tured thing unable to repair itself; on the other, life, power of cre-
ation, which makes itself and remakes itself at each instant. On
the one hand, that which wastes; on the other hand, that which
does not.31
France is a nation able to replenish itself in its war effort because it is a
nation embodying life and creation; whereas Germany is unable to because
28 M 1114–5/MW 34.
29 M 1115/MW 35.
30 MW 12.
31 M 1116/MW 38.
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it is a merely mechanical force. These claims subtly displace Bergson’s ideas
concerning France’s internationalist and moral mission in his two earlier
war discourses. According to the November 1914 discourse “The Force
that Wastes and the Force that Does Not,” France could replenish itself
because it has access to higher supra-national moral principles, principles
above self-interest,32 whereas now the claim is that the nation can replenish
itself by itself and from itself. Life, as Bergson has it, “makes itself and
remakes itself,” and rather than discovering moral principles that exist
beyond it, it is a power of creation. Bergson does not now deny that France
has an elevated and internationalist moral mission, and the opposition of
life and mechanism implies a kind of moral evaluation: the living is sup-
posed to be higher than the mechanical, and thus France superior to Ger-
many. Yet his position now in December 1914—one that will reappear in
1932—seems to be that moral principles are produced, created by a vital
force, and this is the reason why “life” can stand as the motive force and
ultimate justification of France’s war effort.
From this perspective, the claim that in December 1914 “Bergson now
insists that vital energy can only be sustained by ideals of freedom and
justice higher than the life force itself” seems to get things the wrong way
round.33 It seems more apposite to say, as Georges Politzer put it in his
1929 polemical pamphlet La fin d’une parade philosophique: Le berg-
sonisme, that Bergson had come to decide that “sanctifying the war in the
name of freedom was already quite good, but sanctifying it in the name of
life is better.”34 This “mise en sce`ne” of Bergson’s “own philosophy”35 on
the stage of international relations may certainly appear unconvincing, par-
ticularly in the light of his later claim, to which we will return, that all
societies share in the two principles of the “open” and the “closed,” but his
argument is not absurd: France’s supposed respect for international law
and genuinely moral principles, together with its supposed concern for spir-
itualizing modern technology, derives from a different spiritual source than
that governing an alleged German pursuit of power for its own sake.
It is, however, necessary to determine how Bergson’s philosophy of
creative life makes its own mobilization in 1914 possible. What sort of
force is creative life such that it can be opposed not just to an imperialist
nation-state but also to the unbridled technological forces of modernity?
32 See M 1106/MW 45.
33 Donna V. Jones, “Mysticism and War: Reflections on Bergson and his Reception during
World War I,” in Annales bergsoniennes VII, 167–79, at 178.
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An answer to this question, as I have suggested, resides in the recognition
that Bergson’s philosophy of life is at bottom a philosophy of will. This
voluntarism has not always been clearly recognized principally because, as
Arnaud Franc¸ois has remarked, Bergson develops this philosophy of will in
the most deliberate fashion in essays and lectures rather than in his princi-
pal works.36 Nevertheless, chapter three of Creative Evolution contains a
statement of the importance of an idea of will:
For our consciousness to be able to coincide with something of its
principle, it would have to detach itself from the readymade and
attach itself to being-made. The faculty of seeing, twisting and
turning back on itself, would have to become one with the act of
willing [vouloir]. . . . In free action, when we contract the whole
of our being to project it forward, we have the more or less clear
consciousness of the motives and of impelling forces [motifs et
mobiles], and even, at a push, of the becoming through which they
organize themselves into an act; but the pure will [le pur vouloir],
the current which traverses this matter in communicating life to it
is something that we feel only with difficulty.37
The understanding or the intellect—as Bergson has argued earlier—is
equipped to deal only with that which is static, material, and spatial,
whereas our conscious existence is dynamic, spiritual, and temporal. The
faculty through which we have access to the principle of our conscious
existence, then, is not the intellect, but the will. Voluntary action offers the
possibility of an intuition—however indirect and obscure it may be—of the
principle of consciousness and life more generally. Yet we can access this
through an act of will because, as Bergson contends, the “principle of all
life” is a “pure will.”38
“Will” can mean many things. For Bergson, will is not merely an exec-
utive faculty responsive to the proposals of the intellect; it is more original
and primitive than the intellect, and it transcends anything the latter can
propose to it. Bergson considers voluntary action in general in terms of
what he seems to take as one of its particular forms, namely artistic cre-
ation: “[i]f I deliberate before acting, the moments of the deliberation offer
36 See Franc¸ois, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Bergson, 40–60.
37 Bergson, L’e´volution cre´atrice, in Œuvres, ed. Andre´ Robinet (Paris: Presses Universi-
taires de France, 1959), 696–97; Creative Evolution, trans. A. Mitchell (New York:
Henry Holt, 1913), 237–38.
38 Œuvres, 697; Creative Evolution, 238.
PAGE 476
476
................. 18914$ $CH6 07-08-16 14:50:31 PS
Sinclair ✦ Bergson’s Philosophy of Will and the War of 1914–1918
themselves to my consciousness as the successive sketches, each particular
in its own way, that a painter would draw of his painting; and the act itself,
in being carried out, may well realize something desired and consequently
foreseen, but it has nonetheless its own original form.”39 Just as—according
to a modern, Kantian conception of genius, at least—there is something
that goes beyond the realization of conceptual intentions in the production
of an original artwork, so too, for Bergson, veritable action contains an
element that transcends deliberate, reflective intention. This, of course, was
Bergson’s position in his first published book on the “immediate data of
consciousness,” whose title is liberally translated into English as Time and
Free Will: time thought in a nonlinear and thus non-spatialized sense as
duration (dure´e) is the principle of human freedom, a form of freedom irre-
ducible to the power of a libre arbitre to decide on the proposals of the
intellect from on high. Yet by the time of Creative Evolution, the essence of
time as “duration” is itself explicitly conceived according to an idea of will:
“[w]hen we put our being back into our will, and our will itself back into
the impulsion that it extends, we come to understand, we feel that reality is
a continual growth, creation that develops without end.”40
These passages indicate, then, that Bergson conceives of “creation,” as
much as “life,” according to an idea of will. He will assert this explicitly,
although not without some hesitation and still inchoately, in his later work.
After having asserted in the first of two discourses in Madrid in May 1916
that “we cannot be artistic merely by wanting to be so [n’est pas artiste qui
veut],”41 in his 1930 essay “The Possible and the Real,” Bergson claims
that we are “artistic when we want to be [quand nous le voulons].”42 He
goes further in this direction: if the principle of all creation is ge´nialite´, as
he supposes in 1907,43 in 1932 he argues that genius is itself voluntary.
There exist “volonte´s ge´niales,” genial acts of will, volitions that are acts
of genius; “the will has its genius as does thought, and genius defies all
prevision.”44 Such a voluntarist conception of genius is certainly perplex-
ing, in that genius is often thought to involve inspiration and thus to tran-
scend the powers of the individual artist; “where an author owes a product
39 Bergson, “Le possible et le re´el,” in La pense´e et le mouvant, in Œuvres, 1331; The
Creative Mind, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946),
91–92.
40 Œuvres, 698; Creative Evolution, 239.
41 “Confe´rence de Madrid sur l’aˆme humaine,” in M 1200–1215, at 1214.
42 Œuvres, 1334; Creative Mind, 93–94.
43 Œuvres, 634. Arthur Mitchell’s translation of this as “fervor” obscures its derivation
from an idea of genius; Creative Evolution, 173.
44 Bergson, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion in Œuvres, 1023; The Two
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to his genius,” as Kant put it, “he does not himself know how the ideas for
it have entered into his head, nor has he it in his power to invent the like at
pleasure.”45 On this account, the artist cannot invent her products at will,
and one wonders how Bergson’s voluntarism could account for an artist’s
inability to create despite her best efforts—for, say, “writer’s block.”
Bergson’s failure to elaborate on the issue suggests that he is led to his
voluntarist conception of genius indirectly, as a result of other commit-
ments; from, in fact, the conjunction of two theses: an idea of life as will, a
version of which Bergson had doubtless found in the early nineteenth-
century philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer,46 and an attempt in 1907 to
conceive of the non-finalistic development of biological life—and, conse-
quently, of life as a whole—by analogy with a broadly Kantian conception
of the genial, non-conceptual and non-intentional production of novelty in
art. This is precisely what is at stake in Bergson’s extension of an idea of
“creation” and “genius” to biological life. Yet the conjunction of this vol-
untarism and this creationism leads to a voluntarist conception of artistic
creation, which contrasts sharply with the more Kantian, non-voluntarist
position that Schopenhauer had advanced concerning art. It is important to
note this contrast, since Bergson’s wartime discourses had in Germany
earned him accusations of plagiarism as well as chauvinism. It was alleged
that Bergson had borrowed the principal ideas of his philosophy from Scho-
penhauer, but it is clear that the French philosopher’s voluntarist account
of art and creation is one way in which his philosophy contrasts sharply
with that of his German predecessor.47
This voluntarist conception of art production also suggests, however,
that Bergson has developed from Schopenhauer the particular idea that the
will is a principle of spontaneity not entirely controllable by the agent, that
it is, if the traditional terms can be applied here, passive as well as active.
Indeed, as Arnaud Franc¸ois has argued, Bergson comes to think the essence
of will in The Two Sources as emotion, and not simply as that which acts
Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton (South
Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 44.
45 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, rev. and ed. Nicholas Walker, trans. James
Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 137.
46 See Arnaud Franc¸ois, “Bergson plagiaire de Schopenhauer? Analyse d’une pole´mique,”
Etudes germaniques 60, no. 3 (2005): 469–91.
47 See, again, Franc¸ois, “Bergson plagiaire de Schopenhauer?,” but Franc¸ois does not elu-
cidate Bergson’s voluntarist philosophy of art, which distinguishes his position so clearly
from that of Schopenhauer. For Schopenhauer’s philosophy of art, see, for example,
Christopher Janaway, “Knowledge and Tranquility: Schopenhauer on the Value of Art,”
in Schopenhauer, Philosophy, and the Arts, ed. Dale Jacquette (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 39–61.
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on or restrains emotion; in this sense it is possible to think of will, at once
active and passive, as “desire” or even as “love.”48 Yet it is not this version
of his philosophy of will that Bergson mobilizes in 1914. There is no ques-
tion of loving the enemy, and Bergson does not send out a nation of cre-
atives in search of inspiration, unable to marshal their creative powers by
their own effort against the massed ranks of the modern German war
machine. Instead, to Germany, Bergson opposes a force that can be con-
trolled, mastered, mobilized at will, in and for the war effort. This concep-
tion of will as self-mastery never leaves the horizon of Bergson’s thinking,
as can be seen in the conclusion to the “The Possible and the Real,” which
outlines the ethical import of a doctrine of “creative novelty.” In recogniz-
ing the novelty in our experience and actions,
[w]e will, above all, be stronger, for we will feel ourselves partici-
pating, creators of ourselves, in the great work of creation, which
is there from the beginning and which continues before our eyes.
Our capacity to act, in grasping itself, will be intensified. Humili-
ated heretofore in an attitude of obedience, slaves of all kinds of
natural necessities, we will lift ourselves up, masters associated to
a greater Master.49
Bergson speaks in this passage of personal experience, but given that in the
second of his 1916 Madrid discourses he claims that there exist national
personalities, the position can be developed in relation to the nation:50 lead-
ing France to apprehend itself in 1914 as a living force of creative novelty
would allow it to intensify its own power, to assert itself against the base,
mechanical forces of the German empire that oppose it. Such an intensifi-
cation of the French war effort would allow the nation to approach the
heights of mastery, and to achieve a kind of “sacred union” with a divine
principle thought of as a “great Master.”
The tension in Bergson’s philosophy of will between a conception of
command and control, on the one hand, and an idea of desire or love, on
the other, seems to be reflected in his conception of creation itself. On the
one hand, he often uses “creation” as a synonym of maturation;51 and “cre-
ation” cannot, in any sense, be ex nihilo or de novo, deriving from nothing
but the present act of creation itself, if the idea of a creative evolution is
48 See Franc¸ois, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Bergson, 70–73.
49 Œuvres, 1345; Creative Mind, 105–6.
50 “Confe´rence de Madrid: la personalite´,” in M 1215–35, at 1232.
51 See Œuvres, 503; Creative Evolution, 11–12.
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not to amount to a contradiction in terms. Accordingly, his affirmations
of “absolute” or “radical” novelty in 1907 are to be taken merely in an
epistemological sense: an event is “radically new” if it is unforeseeable.
Nevertheless, Bergson is attracted to an idea of absolute novelty in a meta-
physical sense, by an idea of absolute beginnings; and as Newton Stall-
knecht put it in 1934, “Bergson’s philosophy really contains two accounts
of creation.”52 In 1932, for example, he will return to the idea of a creative
evolution by describing “the unforeseeability of forms that life creates from
scratch [de toutes pieces], by discontinuous leaps, all along its evolution.”53
Here Bergson entertains the apparently contradictory idea of a discontinu-
ous evolution. Arguably, one of Bergson’s motives for gesturing towards
creative discontinuity is his philosophy of will as mastery: creation can gen-
uinely be self-creation, and the intensification of power at its most intense,
when the (will)-power of creation derives solely from itself in the present,
without being weighed down by the past. Bergson’s “voluntarism,” in the
sense of a philosophy placing the will at the origin of consciousness, seems
to lead him towards a “voluntarist” theory of time and history, according
to which creation derives from nothing but the creative volition in the pres-
ent. This sense of creation may well contradict much that Bergson says
about time as duration in his principal works, but it nevertheless stands as
an ideal in his reflection on “radical” and “absolute” novelty from 1907
onwards, and it seems to be what he has in mind when he claims in 1914
that the power undergirding the French nation can “make and remake
itself” at every instant.
III. BERGSONISM AND IMPERIALISM
Politzer’s La fin d’une parade philosophique—in which Bergson is
denounced as a “lackey” and “puppet” of the French bourgeoisie, as a
“traitor” and “agent provocateur”—offers one of the most virulent and
influential critiques of Bergson’s mobilization of his philosophy in 1914.
The effect of this pamphlet has recently been compared to a fragmentation
bomb destroying the possibility of any serious return to Bergson’s philoso-
phy not only during the 1930s, but also after the Liberation, when a “new
generation will be indelibly marked by Politzer’s heroic death during the
52 Newton Stallknecht, Studies in the Philosophy of Creation with Especial Reference to
Bergson and Whitehead (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1934), 53.
53 Œuvres, 1072/Two Sources, 95.
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Resistance.”54 Certainly, not everyone now will accept Politzer’s Marxist
certainty that the Great War was to be opposed as a clash internal to capi-
talist imperialism. Still fewer will subscribe to his view that Bergson’s spirit-
ualist philosophy, in the name of life and immediacy, was an ideological
ruse obscuring the significance of dialectical materialism as the sole genu-
inely concrete philosophy of life—and that Bergson’s political engagement
in the service of capitalist imperialism was the “application” of his philoso-
phy “to a purpose for which it was made.”55 Nevertheless, it is fair to say
that there is a direct relation between Bergson’s philosophy and its expres-
sion in his wartime discourses; “some might say that Bergson had lost his
mind or that he had succumbed to a ‘social pressure’ foreign to his philoso-
phy,”56 but, for Politzer, these discourses express an essential element of
Bergson’s thinking. It is also true that these wartime discourses bring to
light the “real character of Bergson’s enterprise,”57 the real meaning of his
philosophy that might otherwise remain obscure. Politzer was right on both
counts, however, for reasons that he did not quite suspect, reasons that
are independent of his Marxist politics and his demand for a “concrete”
philosophy: Bergson’s philosophy of life as creation is—at bottom, or at
least in one of its versions—a philosophy of the will as a self-propelling and
self-constituting power, a power wholly at one’s command, a power that
can and should be intensified. This is why Bergson is able to mobilize his
philosophy of creative evolution for the French war effort; and it is the
philosophical basis of Bergson’s somewhat unphilosophical—that is, unre-
flective, partisan, and chauvinist—response to the outbreak of war. Berg-
son’s interventions may have been driven by other political and personal
factors—by, in particular, a desire to resist the ambient anti-Semitism of the
French Third Republic, as Johann Chapoutot has noted58—but the philo-
sophical basis of his interventions lies in his philosophy of the will. At the
same time, the nature of this philosophy of will is brought into sharper
focus by its mobilization. The discours de guerre can certainly be character-
ized, following Philippe Soulez, as a kind of “doubling [de´doublement]”59
of the philosophical work that Bergson, in his testament, chose to separate
from his more circumstantial writings, but in the heat of the moment they
54 Bianco, Apre`s Bergson, 169.
55 La fin d’une parade philosophique, 238.
56 Ibid., 236.
57 Ibid.
58 See also Johann Chapoutot, “La trahison d’un clerc? Bergson, la grande guerre et la
France,” Francia 35 (2008): 295–316, at 297.
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distill a fundamental position in that philosophical work. Without the war
discourses, it would be much easier to pass over the problematic volunta-
rism in Bergson’s vitalism.
Politzer perhaps had some idea of this voluntarism, particularly when
he cites the following passage from Bergson’s 1915 essay on “French Phi-
losophy,” an essay that, as Soulez puts it, is only an “apparent exception”60
to the rule that every discourse presented during the conflict should be
treated as belonging to the discours de guerre, since it presents evidently
partisan readings of the history of philosophy: “Less famous than Nietz-
sche, Guyau held, before the German philosopher, in more measured terms
and in a more acceptable form, that the moral ideal is to be sought in the
highest possible expansion of life.”61 This, as Politzer claims, “reveals to us
what Bergson thinks of himself” as much as his estimation of his predeces-
sor, Jean-Marie Guyau.62 Yet what Politzer does not state is that if the
essence of life is will, and if the moral ideal is the expansion of life, then the
summum bonum is the expansion and intensification of the will. Will, if it
wills well, wills its own expansion. The will wills dominion and power, but
the principle of power is not external to the will; will, thus, is and should
be a will to will. Bergson may well consider the form of Nietzsche’s philoso-
phy to be unmeasured and unacceptable, and recent German philosophy
in general to be the expression of its appetites and vices, but the French
philosopher’s own ideas have more than a passing resemblance to the
Nietzschean doctrine of the will to power.63
In France, Nietzsche’s philosophy was often characterized as a “doc-
trine of war,” as the theoretical basis of German imperialist expansion.64 In
his December discourse, Bergson appears to offer a similar characterization
when he describes a Germany whose sole principle is that might is right:
The people to whom this power [e´lan] had come were the elect, a
chosen race by whose side the others are races of bondmen. To
such a race nothing is forbidden that may help in establishing
its dominion. Let none speak to it of inviolable right! Right is
what is written in a treaty; a treaty is what registers the will of a
60 Soulez, Bergson politique, 128.
61 M 1180.
62 La fin d’une parade philosophique, 225. On Bergson’s relation to Guyau, see Keith
Ansell-Pearson, “Morality and the Philosophy of Life in Guyau and Bergson,” Continen-
tal Philosophy Review 47, no. 1 (2014): 59–85.
63 I make no claims here concerning the true content of Nietzsche’s doctrine.
64 See, for example, Gabriel Huan, La philosophie de Fre´de´ric Nietzsche, vol. 1, Les doc-
trines de guerre en Allemagne (Paris: Fontemoing, 1917).
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conqueror—that is, the direction of his force for the time being:
force, then, and right are the same thing.65
Bergson will make clear later in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion
that he is attributing these ideas to Nietzsche.66 Yet what exactly is it that
the French philosopher opposes in 1914 to the e´lan of an imperialist Ger-
many, which believes itself to be a nation of masters, but which is enslaved
to the technological powers that have overwhelmed it? More mastery, more
power, a stronger force of a different and supposedly authentic kind. It was
obvious from the title of the 1914 discourse, “The Force that Wastes and
the Force that Does Not,” that Bergson considered the conflict as a clash of
forces, but now it becomes evident that to a decaying and decrepit German
will-to-power, Bergson opposes a self-revitalizing willpower, whose end lies
no less in its intensification and expansion. France is the nation of real
mastery and it must impose its dominion on its sclerotic European enemy.
It is no surprise to see that Bergson was congratulated in the French press
in 1914 for having served the cause of “national expansion.”67 His philoso-
phy of will was well suited for it.
Bergson returns to this issue of imperialism, and to many of the con-
cerns that animated the wartime discourses, in The Two Sources, the book
on morality that had been expected from him for over twenty-five years.68
Here he writes as the actual “philosopher of the future” about whose views
of the war he had previously speculated; and it is necessary to consider
what this older and perhaps wiser philosopher can tell us about his inter-
vention in the Great War. First, the philosopher of 1932 has clearly recog-
nized that what he now terms the “open” and the “closed” are two
tendencies inherent to all societies, and that no particular nation-state can
be wholly determined by either one. All societies are, to a degree, closed in
on themselves, and, standing in opposition to others in a world of scarce
resources, are moved by a war instinct. At the level of discourse, Bergson
notes, this war instinct expresses itself in the demonization of the enemy
“other”: “The two opposed maxims Homo homini deus and Homo homini
lupus are easily reconcilable. When we formulate the first, we are thinking
of a compatriot. The second applies to foreigners.”69 Together with his evo-
cation of the “exaltation of a people at the outbreak of war,” which could
65 M 1112/MW 28.
66 See Œuvres, 1212; Two Sources, 240.
67 Gaston Rageot, La revue de Paris, 1 February 1918, as cited by Politzer, La fin d’une
parade philosophique, 230.
68 On this point, see Soulez and Worms, Bergson (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
2002), 239.
69 Œuvres, 1219; Two Sources, 247.
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“perhaps” be explained as a “defensive reaction against fear,”70 Bergson is
here clearly engaging in an implicit, and probably painful, auto-critique:
the mobilization of his philosophy in the service of the French war effort—
and this in the name of openness, in the name of a concern for humanity in
general—was to a degree a function of a bellicose, perhaps fearful, but cer-
tainly partially closed mind.
Yet if France can no longer be opposed to Germany as a universalist
and open society to one that is self-isolating and closed, the very real social
and philosophical issue of modern technology remains. In the final chapter
of The Two Sources, entitled “Mechanism and Mysticism,” Bergson
addresses this issue in almost identical terms to the December 1914 dis-
course. New technologies have “imparted to our organism an extension so
vast, have endowed it with a power so mighty,” but in this enlarged body
our sprit “remains what it was, too small to fill it, too weak to guide it.”
This disproportion produces “social, political and international problems
which are just so many definitions of this gap, and which provoke so many
chaotic and ineffectual efforts to fill it.”71 In fact, “humanity stands half-
crushed by the progress it has made,” and is perhaps on the verge, as Berg-
son remarks presciently, of developing military technologies that may lead
to its total annihilation. Our enlarged physical capacities, the machinism
that seems to have developed with its own momentum beyond any original
intention, requires “a supplement of spirit.” It requires a spiritual expan-
sion enabling a return to a more austere, spiritual simplicity, one able to
resist the commercial production of new, unnecessary “needs” in the
machine age. Only with such an expansionary purification can we ensure,
Bergson argues, that the basic, alimentary needs of all, rather than of just a
few, can be met. Mechanism “requires a mysticism,”72 which by no means
entails that the former is to be vanquished by the latter, since mysticism
itself requires mechanism in order to gain the requisite freedom from imme-
diate material needs.
It is in this context that, in the final pages of The Two Sources, Bergson
responds briefly to Ernest Seillie`re, fellow member of the Acade´mie de sci-
ences morales et politiques, who—“in a long series of writings, which, for
depth and forcefulness are beyond praise”73—attempts to illuminate the
sense and sources of imperialism.74 Imperialism understood as a political
70 Œuvres, 1218; Two Sources, 246.
71 Œuvres, 1239; Two Sources, 267–68.
72 Œuvres, 1239; Two Sources, 268.
73 Œuvres, 1239; Two Sources, 268.
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reality, as the tendency of social groups and modern nation-states to expand
into foreign territory, is to be accounted for not economically, but meta-
physically, according to a philosophy of life: for Seillie`re, life is essentially
imperialist in that its forms need to exploit and overcome their surround-
ings in order to survive and develop.75 In the human being, this vital reality
expresses itself in a desire to dominate oneself, things, and other people. As
naming such a vital, personal, and social reality, the term “imperialism,”
for Seillie`re, does not have an intrinsically pejorative sense. Nevertheless,
imperialism becomes problematic when it loses its moorings in reason
grounded in experience and becomes guided by improper forms of “mysti-
cism,” whose principal modern forms are: a Rousseauian belief in the essen-
tial goodness of humankind, romantic beliefs in human genius, democratic
beliefs in the essential goodness or rightness of the people, and doctrines of
racial supremacy.
It is in this light that Seillie`re had approached Bergson’s philosophy,
which he takes, like that of Nietzsche, to be one of the recent philosophies
of imperialism. In an article published in German in 1913, and reproduced
as chapter three of his 1917 L’avenir de la philosophie bergsonienne, Seil-
lie`re wondered whether Bergson’s philosophy of life could provide the
grounds for a moral doctrine contrasting with Nietzsche’s supposedly irra-
tionalist, individualist, and ultimately violent imperialism.76 Bergsonism is
a “new mysticism,” one that is “marvelously adapted . . . to the present
state of human knowledge” and that is “the most useful tonic for the sort
of action to which those of good will should rally.” Yet this mysticism car-
ries the risk of abuse by an “excessive will to power,” and without a moral
doctrine Bergson has nothing that he could “oppose, as a brake, to the
temptations already assailing so visibly some of his readers.” It is probable,
supposes Seillie`re, that sympathy will occupy an important position in a
Bergsonian moral doctrine, even though Bergson himself, so far at least,
has placed “the Will to power, much more insistently than sympathy, at the
origin of active life.”77 Seillie`re, then, claims that Bergson’s philosophy is a
philosophy of the will to power, but he also sees the need for this philoso-
phy to be tempered by a moral doctrine of sympathy.
75 For this definition, see Seillie`re, L’avenir de la philosophie bergsonienne (Paris: Alcan,
1917), 37.
76 Seillie`re, “Welche Moralphilosophie la¨sst Bergson erwarten?,” Internationale Zeit-
schrift fu¨r Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik 8, no. 2 (1913): 191–209, and L’avenir du
la philosophie bergsonienne, 34–50.
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Now, without referring to this article in particular, Bergson responds
to Seillie`re by claiming that once genuine mysticism is distinguished from its
improper forms in the imperialism of modern nation-states—which merely
amount, one might say, to ideological mystification—we will recognize that
mysticism is not bound up with imperialism. Even though he adds in a
footnote that his remarks do not address the full senses of both terms in
Seillie`re’s work, Bergson’s first point is that if “we keep to true mysticism,
we shall judge it incompatible with imperialism.”78 Bergson’s philosophy
of mystical openness in 1932 is not imperialist, if by that we mean empire
and dominion over other human beings and societies; instead of empire in
this ordinary sense, he now promotes international law and the nascent
League of Nations.79 Although Bergson holds that a “mystical” concern for
humanity in general is a product of the “mystic genius,”80 of genial acts of
willing, he distinguishes his account of sympathy and openness from any
notion of imperialism. This position contrasts, it should be noted, with the
apparent justification of French colonialism in the 1923 review of de
Tarde’s “Le Maroc, e´cole d’e´nergie”: a developed “philosophy of colonial-
ism” is still required, Bergson wrote there, but France needed to unleash its
power of action, and Morocco needed to be awakened from its slumbers.81
In any case, no sooner has Bergson made this remark, distancing his
own position from a “philosophy of imperialism,” than he qualifies it:
At the most, we will have to admit, as we just put it, that mysticism
cannot be expanded without encouraging a certain, very particular
‘will to power’. It is a question of having dominion, not over men,
but on things, precisely so that man should no longer have it so
much on man.82
So Bergson admits—echoing Seillie`re’s analysis—that his philosophy of
mystical openness presupposes an expansionary and imperialist principle,
a will to power, insofar as the natural world, by means of modern technol-
ogy, is to be dominated, its resources fully exploited, so that humanity as a
whole can live without want and thus in peace. Julien Benda was not
78 Œuvres, 1240; Two Sources, 269.
79 On Bergson’s work at the head of the International Commission for Intellectual Coop-
eration, an advisory organization for the League of Nations, see chapter 9 (written by
Worms) of Soulez and Worms, Bergson.
80 Œuvres, 1240; Two Sources, 269.
81 See the conclusion of “Rapport sur ‘Le Maroc, e´cole d’e´nergie’ d’Alfred de Tarde,” M
1396.
82 Œuvres, 1240; Two Sources, 269.
PAGE 486
486
................. 18914$ $CH6 07-08-16 14:50:35 PS
Sinclair ✦ Bergson’s Philosophy of Will and the War of 1914–1918
wrong, therefore, when he wrote in 1927 that “it is man” that Bergson
“exalts for his genius in making himself master of the earth.”83 Bergson’s
1932 position is what we might call metaphysically expansionary and impe-
rialist, but not imperialist in a narrowly political or social sense; if domin-
ion there must be, this concerns the human being’s relation to the tools it
has created and thus to nature as a whole, but not the relation of person to
person or group to group.84 Nevertheless, it is the metaphysical imperialism
of the will to power underlying Bergson’s later philosophy of mystical sym-
pathy and openness to humanity that is precisely what enabled his philoso-
phy to be mobilized in a time of war to advance the interests of one
imperialist nation-state against another. This imperialism had only to
change its object.
To conclude, it remains to determine whether this voluntarist and
metaphysically imperialist philosophy of the will can respond adequately
to the problems of modern technology that Bergson brings to light. His
philosophy of technology may well, as Fre´de´ric Worms has suggested, rep-
resent “a veritable alternative to the most well-known metaphysical inter-
pretations of this dimension of our history,”85 but from the perspectives
opened by the present essay, a full assessment of this alternative will turn
on two issues. The first is whether Bergson helps us to understand the man-
ner in which modern technology has a social and historical momentum
that, at least in certain historical conjunctures, transcends human will. The
second concerns the possibility of getting technology back under control,
of subjecting it to human dominion by an intensified, expanded, and puri-
fied will. A century after Bergson, we may be more ready to entertain the
idea that the problems of modern technology may actually derive from the
same source as the desire for mastery that is supposed to solve them.
Manchester Metropolitan University.
83 Benda, La trahison des clercs, 228.
84 In 1937 Bergson returns to the necessity of “dominating” modern technology in his
“Message au Congre`s Descartes”: M 1579. In this connection, see Worms and Zanfi’s
“Pre´sentation” to Revue de me´taphysique et de morale, no. 84 (2014/4): 464.
85 Worms, “Pre´sentation,” in Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion, ed. Worms
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008), 14.
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